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Abstract
Causal inference requires an understanding of the conditions under which association equals causation. The
exchangeability or no confounding assumption is well known and well understood as central to this task. More
recently the epidemiologic literature has described additional assumptions related to the stability of causal effects.
In this paper we extend the Sufficient Component Cause Model to represent one expression of this stability
assumption–the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption. Approaching SUTVA from an SCC model helps clarify
what SUTVA is and reinforces the connections between interaction and SUTVA.
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Introduction
The potential outcomes approach is becoming the stan-
dard for causal inference in epidemiology [1]. By provid-
ing a precise definition of a causal effect, this approach
clarifies the assumptions necessary for the ‘associational
smoke’ of our data to indicate ‘causational fire’,t ou s e
Holland’s evocative metaphor [2]. One key requirement,
which has received much attention in epidemiology is the
“no confounding” or exchangeability assumption. More
recently, epidemiologists have argued that this assump-
t i o n ,e v e ni nt h ea b s e n c eo fm e a s u r e m e n te r r o r ,i sn o t
sufficient.
For example, reflecting on their seminal paper “Identifia-
bility, Exchangeability and Confounding”,[3] Greenland
and Robins noted as a shortcoming that this paper “did
not emphasize the importance of limiting the exposure ×
to a potentially changeable condition”. That is, in describ-
ing the conditions necessary for association to equal cau-
sation, they neglected to invoke Holland’sm a n t r a“no
causation without manipulation” [2] or what might be
referred to as a manipulability assumption. Related expres-
sions include the consistency [4], “no treatment variation”
[5], and “no interference” [5] or “no interaction between
subjects” [6] assumptions. An early formulation, given by
Rubin, [7,8] is the Stable Unit Treatment Value assump-
tion (SUTVA).
What unites these assumptions is that they are required
for well-defined causal questions from a potential out-
comes perspective – causal questions that can be posed
as comparisons between “two or more well-defined inter-
ventions” [4] . Recent discussions by Cole and Frangakis,
[9] VanderWeele, [5] Pearl, [10] and Peterson [11] clari-
fied the role of the consistency assumption, provided
mathematical notation for it and examined it using causal
graphs. Hernan and VanderWeele conclude from this
work that “interference between units” a n dw h a tt h e y
refer to as “versions of compound treatments” limit the
transportability of causal effects from one population to
another just as interaction does [12].
These assumptions have been examined from the per-
spective of potential outcomes [11,12] and Directed
Acyclic Graphs. In this paper, we show how the Suffi-
cient Component Cause model can be extended to
represent Rubin’s expression of the no interference
between units and the no compound versions of treat-
ment assumptions – the Stable Unit Treatment Value
Assumption (SUTVA) [7,8]. In so doing we hope to
extend the utility of the Sufficient Component Cause
model. We also think that examining SUTVA through
an SCC lens crystallizes the kinship between interaction
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transportability. Just as the SCC model allows us to see
the ubiquity of interactions, it also allows us to see the
ubiquity of SUTVA violations.
To lay the groundwork, we first provide a brief over-
view of the potential outcomes approach.
The potential outcomes model
Definition of a causal effect
The guiding metaphor of the potential outcomes frame is
the randomized controlled trial. From this perspective,
causal effects are defined as hypothetical intervention
effects. A causal effect is the difference between the out-
comes (e.g., disease or not) that would arise for an indivi-
dual by the end of the observation period under two
different exposure conditions. In considering a disease
outcome, each individual is conceptualized as having a
fixed potential outcome for the disease by the end of the
observation period under each exposure condition,
regardless of their actual exposure status. Therefore,
when comparing two exposure conditions (e.g., exposed
and unexposed), there are four possible sets of potential
outcomes (i.e., response types) for each individual [13].
There is a causal effect of the exposure on the outcome if
and only if an individual’s potential outcomes by the end
of the study period would be different under the two
exposure conditions.
Because a causal effect is defined as the difference in the
outcome in the same individual (or more generally the
same target or unit) at the same time but with different
exposure experiences, a causal effect can never be seen [2].
To estimate causal effects from observations, epidemiolo-
gists use substitutes for the missing data. These substitutes
can provide the correct answer if the potential outcomes
of the substitutes are the same as the potential outcomes
of the people for whom you want to estimate a causal
effect. While we generally cannot hope to find substitutes
for the potential outcomes of a particular individual, we
can hope to find substitutes that represent the distribution
of potential outcomes among a group of individuals [14].
This is referred to as the exchangeability or no confound-
ing assumption [13] and is well known, well accepted and
well studied, in epidemiology.
But an additional assumption is necessary to estimate
the precise causal effect defined from a potential outcomes
perspective - SUTVA, the Stable Unit Treatment Value
Assumption [8].
What is SUTVA?
The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption, as devel-
oped by Rubin [7,8], is the assumption that each individual
has only one potential outcome under each exposure con-
dition. This is necessary to ensure that the causal effect for
each individual is stable. This stability assumption has two
elements:
1. that the exposure has the same effect on an indivi-
dual regardless of how the individual came to be
exposed, and
2. that the effect of the exposure on an individual is
independent of the exposure of other individuals
Within epidemiology, the first aspect of SUTVA is
sometimes referred to as the consistency assumption [4]
and the treatment variation irrelevance assumption [5].
In epidemiology, the term SUTVA is often reserved for
the second assumption[15] although Cole and Frangakis
connect the first assumption with the consistency
assumption [9].
Violation of either aspect of SUTVA creates unstable
estimates of the causal effec t .B yu n s t a b l ew em e a nt h a t
there is no unique potential outcome for each individual
under each exposure condition. In general, the instability
arises because there are multiple “versions of treatment”.
Although the treatment was defined as a single construct,
it really represents different versions of treatments that
were not recognized and delineated. Each version of the
treatment may influence a particular individual in a differ-
ent way. Thus an individual may have more than one
potential outcome for what is considered in the study to
be a single treatment condition. These different versions
of treatment arise from ambiguities in the measurement
or operationalization of the treatment (violation of the
first aspect of SUTVA) or from effects of the treatments
received by others (violation of the second aspect of
SUTVA).
We now build a Sufficient Component Cause Model
[16] and define corresponding potential outcomes and
response types [13] when exchangeability and SUTVA
hold. We then extend this model to depict violations of
SUTVA.
SCC model and response types for a single dichotomous
exposure and outcome with no SUTVA violation
Figure 1 depicts a minimal Sufficient Component Cause
model that describes the effects of an exposure on an
outcome. We assume that there are no SUTVA violations
in this example. The exposure is precisely defined and
therefore we can easily imagine an intervention that
would remove the exposure from the population. In the
first sufficient cause, this precisely defined exposure
works with its “causal partners” (denoted by U) to cause
disease. By “causal partners”, we mean the other compo-
nent causes that activate or allow the exposure to cause
the disease. A second sufficient cause indicates that the
exposure can be preventive (denoted by Ê, the absence of
exposure) in the context of other causal partners (W).
Individuals can also get the disease from mechanisms
Schwartz et al. Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2012, 9:3
http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/9/1/3
Page 2 of 11that do not include the exposure under study; these other
unspecified mechanisms are denoted by X.
T h et a b l ea tt h eb o t t o mo fF i g u r e1d i s p l a y st h es e t s
of potential outcomes implied by this simple Sufficient
Component Cause model. If we assume monotonicity
(i.e., in this context, that E can be causal but not pre-
ventive), there are no individuals in this population with
the set of potential outcomes shown in the grey row.
This would happen, for example, if no one in this popu-
lation were exposed to W.
The causal effect for each individual is defined by the
difference between the potential outcomes of the indivi-
dual under the two different exposure conditions. For
example, the exposure would have no causal effect for
individuals with the sets of potential outcomes depicted in
the first and the last rows; the difference between the two
potential outcomes for these individuals is 0. For indivi-
duals in the first row, labeled as “doomed” types [12], the
exposure has no effect because whether or not they are
exposed, they get the disease. Their potential outcome
under both exposed and unexposed conditions is 1 and
thus the difference between their potential outcomes
under exposure and non-exposure (i.e., 1-1) is 0.
For individuals in the last row, labeled as “immune”
types, the exposure has no effect because whether or not
they are exposed, they do not get the disease. Their poten-
tial outcome under both exposed and unexposed condi-
tions is 0. Under monotonicity, the exposure only has an
effect on individuals in the second row, labeled the “cau-
sal” types. Their potential outcomes under exposed and
unexposed conditions differ (1-0 = 1) and thus the expo-
sure has a causal effect for them. Since there are no
SUTVA violations, the causal effect is stable for all
individuals.
The causal effect for a population would be a compari-
son between the potential outcomes (i.e., risk of disease) if
everyone were exposed compared with the risk of disease
if everyone were unexposed. This represents the average
of the causal effects for the individuals in the population.
This average causal effect can be expressed in terms of the
population proportions of the different response types.
The doomed and causal types are those who develop
disease under exposure and the doomed and preventive
types are those who develop disease under non-exposure.
Thus, the causal effect can be expressed as a contrast
between the sum of the doomed and causal proportions
EÊ X UW
Outcomeif
exposedto:
Individual
CausalEffect
Stable? TYPE
(proportionin
population)
“CausalPartners”
EÊ
111 Ͳ 1=0Y e s Doomedpr(1) X,or(U+W)
101 Ͳ 0=1Y e s Causalpr(2) Uandnotdoomed
010 Ͳ 1=Ͳ1Y e s Preventivepr(3) Wandnotdoomed
000 Ͳ 0=0Y e s Immunepr(4) NotU,WorX
Outcomes:1=present,0=absent
Greyshadowing:notpossibleifassumemonotonicity(i.e.,noWinthispopulation)
Figure 1 Simple SCC model and corresponding response types.
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Under monotonicity, the average causal risk difference is
represented by the proportion of causal types in the popu-
lation, pr(2). When monotonicity does not hold the aver-
age causal risk difference is represented by the proportion
of causal types, pr(2), minus the proportion of preventive
types, pr(3).
Note that in estimating causal effects, we always “give
priority to the doomed”. That is, if an individual has both
U1 and × by the end of the study period the exposure has
no causal effect for the individual even if she actually got
the disease from the exposure. The causal effect is defined
as the difference in potential outcomes at the end of the
study period and if an individual had × by that time, there
would be no difference in the individual’sp o t e n t i a lo u t -
comes by the end of the study period [17]. Nonetheless, if
the individual had U1 b e f o r eX ,t h ee x p o s u r ea c t u a l l y
would have caused her disease despite having no causal
effect on the disease. That is, epidemiologic methods
generally estimate only excess (i.e., end of study) but not
etiologic (i.e., actual) effects [18].
Of course we cannot “see” the causal effect in a popula-
tion because we do not know the distribution of types.
However, if we imagine randomly assigning exposure to
individuals in this population, then on average the distri-
bution of types in the exposed and unexposed groups
will be the same and the average causal effect in this
population will be identifiable. In observational studies
too, the average causal effect will be identifiable if the dis-
tribution of types is the same in the exposed and unex-
posed groups – i.e., if the two groups are exchangeable.
This provides a clear meaning for the exchangeability or
no confounding assumption [13].
To ease the extension of this model into violations of
SUTVA we will use the following example. Suppose we
are interested in estimating the causal effect of bicycle
riding (defined as riding 30 miles a week) on weight loss
(defined as losing 5 pounds or more) by the end of the
study period. We can imagine randomly assigning each
individual in an infinitely large population to a “bicycle
riding” or “no bicycle riding” condition and noting if they
lose weight by the end of the study period. If this were an
idealized randomized controlled trial (i.e., full compliance
- everyone rides either 30 miles a week or not all, no loss
to follow-up, infinite sample size), the average causal
effect in this population would be a contrast between the
proportions of individuals who lose weight among the
bicycle riding and no bicycle riding conditions.
We can also express these sets of potential outcomes
from the perspective of a sufficient component cause
model. We can conceptualize the Sufficient Component
Cause model in Figure 1 as depicting the sufficient causes
f o rw e i g h tl o s sf r o mt h ep e r s p ective of this intervention.
E now represents the bicycle riding condition, and Ê the
no bicycle riding condition. Some individuals in this popu-
lation would lose weight if they were exposed –those who
would have the causal partners of the exposure, U, by the
end of the study period. Other individuals, those who
would have × by the end of the study period, would lose
weight with or without the exposure. Some individuals,
t h o s ew i t hW ,w i l lo n l yl o s ew e i g h ti ft h e yr e m a i nu n e x -
posed. Individuals without U, X, and W will not lose
weight, regardless of their exposure status.
Sufficient component cause model and response types to
depict SUTVA
To estimate a precise causal effect of bicycle riding on
weight loss in this population, it is assumed that each indi-
vidual has one potential outcome under the exposed con-
dition and one potential outcome under the unexposed
condition. SUTVA is an articulation of this assumption
and the ways in which it can be violated. SUTVA is vio-
lated if the random assignment of the individual to the
same treatment condition at the same moment in time
could result in different outcomes. How could this hap-
pen? As we noted above, there are two general ways in
which SUTVA could be violated. We discuss them in turn
below.
Violation of SUTVA through different versions of
treatment
SUTVA could be violated if in operationalizing the expo-
sure, there are really two different versions that are being
randomly assigned. In our example, suppose everyone
assigned to bicycle riding is assigned to ride 30 miles a
week on a local bike path. Unbeknownst to the
researcher, some of the rides take place on a part of the
bike path with a hilly terrain and other rides take place
on a flat terrain. If the energy expenditure of the two dif-
ferent versions of bike riding would have different effects
for the same individual, there are three (hilly ride, flat
ride, or no ride) rather than two potential outcomes for
the set of exposure and non-exposure conditions. For
some individuals, their response type is not stable
b e c a u s et h e ya r ead i f f e r e n t“type” depending on which
version of exposure they received. Here, unrepresented
v e r s i o n so ft h ee x p o s u r ew o u l dv i o l a t eS U T V A .F i g u r e2
depicts a Sufficient Component Cause model and corre-
sponding response types to represent a violation of
SUTVA from an operationalization that leads to differ-
ent, unrepresented versions of the treatment.
The variable that we considered a single unified expo-
sure in our imagined randomized control trial, bicycle
riding, (E) is actually two different exposures (E1 =f l a t
rides and E2 = hilly rides), each of which has a unique
effect on some individuals in the population. A precise
causal effect in this population, that is the effect of
assigning everyone to ride 30 miles a week compared
Schwartz et al. Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2012, 9:3
http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/9/1/3
Page 4 of 11with assigning everyone to not ride, would not be pre-
cisely definable in this population. The causal effect
would depend on: (1) the distribution of the different ver-
sions of treatment (E1 vs. E2) – a characteristic of the
particular operationalization of the “treatment” in this
particular study, and (2) the proportion of individuals
who have different potential outcomes for E1 and E2 – a
characteristic of this population.
A Sufficient Component Cause model for this scenario
is shown at the top of Figure 2. For some individuals,
those with only the causal partner depicted by U1,
bicycle riding would lead to weight loss only if they
rode on the flats (E1) (because, for example, they would
go more quickly and therefore expend more energy rid-
ing on the flats). Other individuals, those with only the
causal partner depicted by U2, would lose weight only if
they rode on the hills (E2) (because they have to work
hard to climb the hill). Some individuals, those with U1
and U2, would lose weight either way (because they
w o u l dr i d eq u i c k l yo nt h ef l a t sa n dw o r kh a r do nt h e
hills).
We imagined randomizing each individual to bicycle rid-
ing, but didn’t specify the type of riding to which they
were assigned. Each individual is exposed to only one ver-
sion of bicycle riding, but we don’tk n o ww h i c hv e r s i o n
because we didn’t “represent” it in our study. In fact,
b e c a u s ew ed o n ’t represent the version of exposure, we
don’t even know the proportion of individuals who
received the different versions of the exposure. These
unrepresented versions of exposure would lead to unstable
potential outcomes for some individuals, and therefore an
undefined causal effect. For some individuals a comparison
between their potential outcomes under the exposed and
unexposed condition (whether it is 1 or 0), will depend on
which version of treatment they receive.
The table in Figure 2 shows the potential outcomes
under each version of exposure. In any particular rando-
mization, individuals assigned to E would either get E1,
E1 X U1
Outcomeifexposedto: CausalEffectOFE Stable? APPARENTTYPE “CausalPartners”
E1 E2 Ê
111 E 1 vs.Ê:1Ͳ1=0
E2 vs.Ê:1Ͳ1=0
Yes Doomed
Doomed
X,or(U1,U2 ,W)
110 E 1 vs.Ê:1 Ͳ 0=1
E2 vs.Ê:1 Ͳ 0=1
Yes E1 Causal
E2 Causal
U1 andU2 only
101 E 1 vs.Ê:1Ͳ 0=1
E2vs.Ê:0Ͳ 1=Ͳ1
No E1 Doomed
E2 Preventive
WandU1 only
100 E 1 vs.Ê:1Ͳ 0=1
E2vs.Ê:0 Ͳ 0=0
No E1 Causal
E2 Immune
U1 only
011 E 1 vs.Ê:0Ͳ 1=Ͳ1
E2 vs.Ê:1Ͳ 1=0
No E1 Preventive
E2 Doomed
WandU2 only
010 E 1 vs.Ê:0Ͳ0=0
E2 vs.Ê:1Ͳ0=Ͳ1
No E1Immune
E2Causal
U2 only
001 E 1 vs.Ê:0Ͳ 1=Ͳ1
E2 vs.Ê:0 Ͳ 1=Ͳ1
Yes E1Preventive
E2Preventive
Wonly
000 E 1 vs.Ê:0Ͳ0=0
E1 vs.Ê:0Ͳ0=0
Yes Immune
Immune
Not(U1,U2,W,X)
U2 E2 W Ê
Figure 2 Simple SCC model and corresponding response types representing different versions of treatment. Grey shadowing indicates
not present under monotonicity
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a comparison between E1 and Ê or E2 and Ê depending
on which version of exposure they received. Rows in
grey would not arise under monotonicity (e.g., if the
exposure is only causal or neutral but never preventive
compared with the no exposure condition).
Despite the difference in the versions of treatment, the
potential outcomes of some individuals in the population
will be stable: the doomed [those who have (X) or (U1,
U2 and W)], the E1 and E2 causal (those who have U1
and U2 only), and the immune (those who have none of
the component causes, U1,U 2, W or X). Unstable indivi-
duals are those who do not have × and have either U1 or
U2, but not both. As an example, consider individuals in
row 4 (i.e., those who have U1 only). The exposure would
have a causal effect for these individuals if they got E1
(i.e., the difference in their potential outcomes under this
version of E vs. Ê is 1) but not if they got E2.I ft h e yg o t
E2 the difference in their potential outcomes under this
version of E vs. Ê is 0. What is the causal effect of E for
these individuals? We can’t say without specifying the
version of treatment they received.
It should be noted that under monotonicity, anyone
who is doomed regarding E1 is also doomed regarding E2
since once a monotonicity assumption is invoked, only
individuals with × are doomed and they would be
doomed regardless of the version of E to which they were
exposed. Further, SUTVA is violated by different versions
of treatment only if there are individuals in the popula-
tion who would have a different potential outcome if
exposed to the different versions of treatment (i.e., have
only U1 or U2 but not both). If all individuals would
respond the same way to both versions of treatment, this
aspect of SUTVA would not be violated [5].
Note that in the example we used, the potential out-
come of all individuals was stable under non-exposure
since there was only one version of non-exposure. One
could imagine more complex scenarios where the causal
effect of interest is the difference between two active
treatments, each of which could have unrepresented ver-
sions [5]. Nonetheless, in many epidemiologic contexts,
where the causal effect is defined in terms of the presence
or absence of E, only the potential outcomes under E
would be affected.
This first aspect of SUTVA is violated to some extent in
all studies [9,19]. The constructs that we measure or
manipulate are never exactly what we intend. For example,
in an RCT context, SUTVA is violated by non-compliance
[5]. In an RCT we estimate causal effects of the treatment
with the full recognition that there is some slippage
between the causal effect that we often want (the effect of
the active treatment) and the causal effect that we get (the
effect of treatment assignment). Similarly, in an observa-
tional study, the exposures that individuals experience and
that we measure are never exactly the same. To the extent
that these different exposure experiences create different
effects for some individuals, the causal effect that is esti-
mated will not be very precise.
One solution to violations of this aspect of SUTVA is to
represent the unrepresented versions of treatment. In our
bike riding example, one could have two active treatments
– bike riding on hills and bike riding on flats – instead of
one. The more narrowly the exposure is defined, the less
likely this aspect of SUTVA will be violated. However,
there is a tension between the goal of defining an exposure
narrowly enough to avoid SUTVA violations and defining
a construct broadly enough that the effects can be general-
ized beyond the particular operationalization of the expo-
sure in a study [9,20]. More sophisticated methods for
estimating causal effects under multiple versions of treat-
ment also depend on the representation of the previously
unrepresented versions [21].
When SUTVA is violated by interference between units, as
described below, the situation is more complex
Violation of SUTVA through interference between units
The second aspect of SUTVA could be violated if some
individuals were influenced by the exposure assignment of
other individuals. For example, an individual randomized
to no bike riding may notice that those who were assigned
to the riding group seemed happier. In response, they
began their own exercise regiment, (e.g., they started run-
ning), which leads to weight loss. Or individuals noticed
that those in the bicycle group were losing weight and
looked really good so in response they changed their diet.
We refer to the people whose exposure status influences
the outcomes of other people as “influential others”.W h a t
makes others “influential” could be a characteristic of
these individuals (e.g., they are powerful), their number
(e.g., the proportion of people who are assigned to expo-
sure) or the relationships among individuals (e.g., mem-
bers of a social network). These “influential others” could
affect an individual’s potential outcome either independent
of or dependent on the individuals’ own exposure assign-
ment. Both of these situations could lead to a SUTVA
violation as explained below.
It should be noted that although everyone is “exposed”
to these influential others (in the sense that they are in
t h es a m ep o p u l a t i o n )n o te v e r y o n ei sa f f e c t e db yt h e m .
Influential others only have an effect on individuals with
the necessary causal partners. These causal partners
could, but need not, include contact between the influ-
ential others and the individual.
In this violation of SUTVA, although a single expo-
sure was randomly assigned, the exposure essentially has
two versions: one version when the individual receives
the exposure in the presence of exposed influential
others and another version when the individual receives
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others. A Sufficient Component Cause model underlying
this scenario is shown at the top of Figure 3. An indivi-
dual’s own exposure condition is indicated as E if
exposed and Ê if not exposed. The exposure condition
of influential others is indicated as I if the influential
others are exposed and as Î if the influential others are
unexposed.
Some individuals would lose weight if they are
assigned to bicycle riding regardless of the exposure
assignment of influential others – they have U1, the cau-
sal partners of E. Some individuals would lose weight if
influential others are assigned to bicycle riding regard-
less of their own exposure assignment – they have the
causal partners of I, U2. Other individuals may lose
weight only if both they and influential others are
assigned to the exposure group; they have U3, the causal
partners of E and I.
For some individuals, those with W1, the exposure may
be protective (e.g., they may lose weight only if they don’t
ride, perhaps because they over-eat when they ride). Like-
wise, the exposure of influential others may negatively
affect the weight loss of some individuals, those with W2,
if for example they are rebellious and do not want to
exercise if others are doing so. Protective effects are indi-
cated by the sufficient causes in grey and the rows in
grey. If we invoke a monotonicity assumption (e.g., if we
assume that neither the individual’s own exposure, E, nor
the exposure of influence others I, is ever preventive),
only the white rows would be relevant. In many situa-
tions, such an assumption would be justified. We begin
with this assumption and briefly discuss the implications
of loosening this assumption later.
An individual may be randomized to exposure or not,
when influential others are also exposed; the causal con-
trast depicting this effect is EI vs. ÊI. An individual may
Figure 3 SUTVA violations from interference between units.
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others are not assigned to the exposure group; EÎ vs. ÊÎ.
These sets of potential outcomes are shown in the table
in Figure 3. For some individuals, the potential out-
comes are stable; whether their contrast is EI vs. ÊI or
EÎ vs. ÊÎ, the causal effect of the exposure is the same.
These individuals are the doomed, who lose weight
regardless of their assignment or the assignment of any-
one else (individuals who have X); those who are causal
regardless of the assignment of others (individuals who
have U1 only), and those who are immune (individuals
who do not have X, U1 or U2).
Three types of individuals have unstable potential out-
comes: 1) Individuals who are susceptible both to their
own exposure assignment as well as the assignment of
influential others – those with U1 and U2 only. Their
causal effect is 1 if influential others are not exposed, but
0 if influential others are exposed; 2) Individuals who are
susceptible to exposure only if influential others are also
exposed – those with U3. Their causal effect is 0 if influ-
ential others are not exposed but 1 if influential others
are exposed; and 3) Individuals who are susceptible to
the exposure of influential others, regardless of their own
exposure – individuals with U2 only. While this group
has unstable potential outcomes (they are immune for EÎ
vs. ÊÎ and doomed for EI vs. ÊI), their causal effect is
stable. The exposure would have no causal effect for
them in either scenario, but in one instance they lose
weight and in the other they do not.
In any particular trial of this exposure, an individual is
assigned to exposure or non-exposure, and influential
others are assigned to exposure or non-exposure (i.e., EÎ
vs. ÊÎ or EI vs. ÊI). The proportion of types represented in
the population would then depend on the proportion of
individuals in the population who were randomized to
each exposure condition, the proportion of types in the
population, and the distribution of influential others ran-
domized to each exposure condition in the population.
In the example we used, “influential others” are charac-
terized as individuals who would affect anyone with the
appropriate causal partners. This would happen, for exam-
ple, if influential others were simply older individuals,
powerful individuals or a particular proportion of indivi-
duals. The situation can become far more complex when
who is “influential” is dependent on social network rela-
tionships. So for example, if friendship links defined influ-
ential others, SUTVA would be violated when individuals
with such links are included in the same study. These
situations can also be conceptualized as causal partners of
the exposure but the causal partners would need to
include different sufficient causes for different influential
others.
In addition, when the monotonicity assumption of no
preventive effects is not reasonable, the number of
situations where individuals will have unstable potential
outcomes is substantially increased as indicated by the
grey rows in Figure 3. One can easily imagine some sce-
narios where the exposure of influential others could
have an adverse effect on other exposed individuals. For
example, an exposure may lose its appeal when it
becomes prevalent (e.g., the effectiveness of a virginity
pledge [22]).
Like the first aspect of SUTVA, this second aspect of
SUTVA (sometimes referred to as a “no interference
between units assumption”) [6,15] is also violated in
many studies [5,9]. Infectious diseases provide a classic
example, where the exposure of some individuals is the
source of disease in others. Similar processes shape
human behaviors and actions. To the extent that we
study exposures which are at least partially under an
individual’s control or shaped by social processes, this
aspect of SUTVA will also be violated [19].
Various solutions to violations of this aspect of
SUTVA have been proposed. All require either the elim-
ination of the interference between units through a nar-
rowing of the causal question [23] or a recognition and
representation of the interference [8]. This parallels
solutions to the problems of unrepresented versions of
treatment. For SUTVA to hold, the different versions of
the exposure and the interference between units need to
be eliminated or represented (e.g., [24-27]) For example,
if spouses both appear in a study and for some indivi-
duals the effect of the exposure depends on the spouse’s
exposure, a solution would be to consider four rather
than two exposure conditions - an individual can be
exposed or not when the spouse is exposed and the
individual can be exposed or not when the spouse is not
exposed [28]. Another approach is to separate the causal
questions to represent the different versions of treat-
ment in separate causal analyses [23,29] distinguishing
between the direct effects of the exposure and indirect
effects that are a consequence of interference between
units.
Conclusion
SUTVA for causal generalization
SUTVA is clearly a requirement for estimating the pre-
cise causal effect defined from a potential outcomes
frame. [5,9,10][12]. Rooted in manipulation theories of
causation, the goal of a study is to estimate the effect of
manipulating the exposure. If SUTVA is violated, one
cannot consistently predict the effect of manipulating
t h ee x p o s u r eo nt h eo u t c o m ea n dt h u st h ec a u s a le f f e c t
is not unitary or stable. The correspondence between
the study results and an intervention effect will depend
heavily on the extent to which the distribution of the
versions of treatment in the study matches the distribu-
tion of the versions in the intervention [12].
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for bicycle riding was found, but it was due to the fact
that most of the rides took place on hills. Suppose further
that the researchers, unaware of this unrepresented ver-
sion of treatment, mounted an intervention where all the
rides took place on the flats. The intervention will not
replicate the study effect. Similarly, if in the study the
exposure’s effect were contingent on the assignment of
influential others and the intervention did not include
influential others, the study and intervention effects
could be quite different. Exchangeability and SUTVA are
both necessary assumptions for the estimation of this
precise causal effect, the effect that changing the expo-
sure would have in this population. That is, SUTVA is
required for transportability of the study’s exposure effect
not only to different populations, [12] but even to the
effect of an actual intervention in the study population
[30,31].
However, examining SUTVA from the context of a Suf-
ficient Component Cause model, a model that highlights
the contingency of causal effects, implies a critical dis-
tinction between exchangeability and SUTVA in their
respective roles in causal inference. Exchangeability is a
requirement for the internal validity of the results; with-
out exchangeability, association does not indicate causa-
tion. By causation, we mean the difference between what
actually happened and what would have happened except
that the exposure was absent and all else were equal [16].
Without exchangeability, even the interpretation of the
association between the exposure and disease as an actual
local effect (that is the effect the exposure actually had in
the study) is suspect. SUTVA, on the other hand, is not
required for identifying the actual causes of the outcome
in the actual extant circumstances.
Rather, SUTVA is required for transportability – for
generalization of the causal effect outside of the particu-
lar conditions of the study at hand [20,32]. The first
aspect of SUTVA, no unrepresented versions of treat-
ment, is necessary to generalize the causal effect of the
exposure beyond its particular operationalization in the
study - consideration of construct validity. The second
aspect of SUTVA is required for generalization to set-
t i n g st h a td i f f e rf r o mt h eo n eu n d e rs t u d y– considera-
tion of external validity. Shadish, Cook and Campbell’s
[20] validity scheme helps to articulate this distinction. In
their schema, they distinguish between causal description
and causal generalization. Causal description (what epi-
demiologists would refer to as internal validity) entails
the identification of a causal relationship between two
variables as they were manipulated or measured within a
particular context [31]. Causal explanation entails an
understanding of “the mechanisms through which (con-
struct validity) and the conditions under which (external
validity) that causal relationship holds” p.9.
In examining Figure 2, the causal effect of the exposure
as operationalized in the study is identifiable (i.e. the
exchangeability assumption is met and the study is
internally valid). This operationalization represents the
average of the effects of the versions of treatment as they
are distributed in the study in this particular population.
It is a true causal effect, but one that may not be replic-
able without further analysis of the effects of the particu-
lar operationalization of the exposure in the study. That
is, without representing the unrepresented versions of
treatment, the first part of SUTVA is violated and the
precise meaning of the exposure construct is unclear. To
continue our example, the causal effect identified in the
study would be the effect of bicycle riding across condi-
tions of hills and flats as they arose in this particular
population at this particular moment in time. Just as the
heterogeneity of effects across individuals limits all stu-
dies to the identification of the average causal effect
across individuals in a population, so too the heterogene-
ity of the versions of treatment yields an average causal
effect across the different, unrepresented versions of
treatment in the study. It is a true causal effect, not just
an association, but not a causal effect whose magnitude
will necessarily generalize to other operationalizations of
the exposure.
Similarly, the effect of the treatment assignment of some
individuals on the outcomes of others, renders the causal
effect identified as the actual causal effect given the parti-
cular context in which a particular group of individuals is
exposed or given the context of a particular distribution of
influential others. This can be seen in Figure 3, where the
effect of influential others modifies the effect of the expo-
sure of the individual. This effect modification, the distri-
bution of the causal partners, is what makes a causal effect
context dependent. For the causal effect to generalize
from the study results to an intervention effect, the second
aspect of SUTVA (external validity in Shadish, Cook and
Campbell’s scheme) must hold.
SUTVA violations contrast sharply with violations of
the exchangeability assumption. Without exchangeability,
both the estimated causal effect defined in terms of the
effect the exposure actually had in the study context and
the estimated effect it would have in the future would be
misleading. To the extent that non-exchangeability was
responsible for the exposure-disease association, the
association did not reflect a causal effect of the exposure
on the outcome.
It may be that SUTVA has not been as prominent in
epidemiology as exchangeability because much of epide-
miology has been concerned with questions about the
causes of effects – the identification of factors that, in at
least some contexts, cause an outcome. For this task,
exchangeability is dominant. The potential outcomes
frame leads to a different type of causal inquiry, questions
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t h ee x p o s u r e .I tm a yb et h a tt h ec a u s a le f f e c t sw ee s t i -
mate in our studies, even when SUTVA holds, should be
more modestly considered as a task of causal identifica-
tion rather than the effect of causal manipulation.
The SCC model allows us to see the intimate relation-
ship between interaction and SUTVA violations. Because
we assume that interaction is ubiquitous, we acknowledge
that the effects we estimate in our studies are the average
of different causal effects. We do this with the recognition
that the average causal effect can be very misleading for
some purposes particularly if there is qualitative interac-
tion – that is if an exposure can be causal in the presence
of some causal partners and protective in others. In future
studies we try and identify some of the causal partners of
the exposure that we think account for dramatic differ-
ences in the exposure’se f f e c t .
Examining SUTVA violations through an SCC lens,
reinforces the analogy with interaction - the causal effect
in any study represents the average of the effect of the
different versions of treatment that are unarticulated
and unmeasured.
We think that the implications of these different
approaches to framing causal questions deserve more
attention [19]. We also think that a fuller consideration of
the relationship between Shadish, Cook and Campbell’s
schema and the potential outcomes approach to causation
in epidemiology, could be beneficial [32-34].
In this paper, we presented simple Sufficient Compo-
nent Cause models depicting SUTVA violations to
describe the basic elements of this assumption. A fuller
explication will need to take into account preventive
effects and the consequences of SUTVA violations for
the viability of the exchangeability assumption.
Abbreviations
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